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A. Nature of Case 
On April 15, 2011, an accident occurred at the Lucky Friday mine, in Idaho's Silver Valley, 
when the ceiling in one of the mining areas collapsed. At the time of the accident, two miners, Pete 
Marek and Mike Marek, were in the mining area, which is called a "stope." The two miners had not 
been directed to work in the stope at that time-indeed, they were assigned to be elsewhere in the 
mine-but had gone there on their own. When the ceiling collapsed, Pete Marek and Mike Marek 
were injured, with Pete's injuries proving fatal. This lawsuit seeks tort damages on their behalf, and 
on behalf of their families, against Hecla Limited-which owns the Lucky Friday mine and employed 
the Mareks-as well as certain affiliated corporations and certain Hecla managers. 
However, Pete and Mike Marek were employees who were injured on the job. The worker's 
compensation system is the exclusive remedy for such injuries, unless the actions that caused the 
injuries satisfy a narrow exception to the rule. Specifically, the worker's compensation law provides 
that employees are exempted from the exclusive-remedy rule only if the actions that injured them 
were "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." Idaho Code§ 72-209(3). This Court has addressed 
the scope of this language twice, and held both times that employees may file claims in court only 
when the employer or its agents had "an intention to injure the employee." Kearney v. Denker, 114 
Idaho 755 (1988); DeMoss v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176 (1990). 
No one contends that any Defendant intended to injure Pete or Mike Marek. Plaintiffs make 
no such argument, and neither did the U.S. Mine Safety & Health Administration (MSHA), Heda's 
chief regulator. So, unable to prevail under this Court's precedent, Plaintiffs attempt to reinterpret it, 
1 
to so that plaintiffs who 
recklessness or gross negligence can sue their employers in court, in addition to receiving worker's 
compensation benefits. 
The Court should reject Plaintiffs' inaccurate reading of precedent. The worker's 
compensation law is clear as to the conduct required before an employee can bring a lawsuit for work 
injuries, and this Court's precedent interpreting the statute is equally clear-and has been settled for 
decades. Idaho's rule is also consistent ,vith the vast majority of other states, which have adopted the 
same rule. Expanding the claims that can be brought in court would undermine the compromise 
crafted by the Legislature in the worker's compensation law-a compromise that gives employees 
s,vift and certain compensation regardless of fault, but also gives employers some certainty and lower 
litigation costs. If claims of recklessness or gross negligence for workplace injuries are permitted in 
court, that compromise would be disrupted, and the Legislature's intent thwarted. 
Thus, this Court should affirm the district court's summary judgment for Defendants. The 
exception to the worker's compensation exclusivity rule is clearly defined, and there is no question 
that Plaintiffs do not and cannot satisfy it. 
B. Procedural History 
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on April 12, 2013. (R. 11-29) Defendants answered the complaint, 
stating as an affirmative defense that the worker's compensation law is the exclusive remedy for 
Plaintiffs' claims. (R. 42-53) On February 10, 2015, after discovery, Plaintiffs moved for summary 
judgment on the exclusivity question. On February 23, 2015, Defendants cross-moved for summary 
judgment on the same question. On April 21, 2015, the district court, the Honorable Benjamin 
2 
motion 
977-986; R. 979(a) and (b))1 
In a vm.tten decision, the district court explained that "[g]enerally, the Idaho worker's 
compensation law provides the exclusive remedy for i11juries arising out of lli'1d in the course of 
employment." (R. 979(a), citing Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757) The only exception, the court continued, 
is where the injury is caused by "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." (Id., quoting Idaho Code 
§ 72-209(c)) Applying this Court's decisions in Kearney and DeMoss, the district court held that 
Plaintiffs' allegations of recklessness were insufficient: "In the case at bar, there are no allegations 
that Defendants acted with any subjective intent to harm Pete and/or Mike Marek, nor are there any 
allegations that Defendants believed that harm was substantially certain to occur." (R. 981) As a 
result, the court held that Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was the worker's compensation law, and so 
their lawsuit was barred. (R. 985-86) The district court entered final judgment on May 5, 2015. (R. 
988-89) Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal on May 22, 2015. (R. 990-94) 
On April 29, 2015, before the court entered final judgment, Plaintiffs filed a document 
captioned "motion for reconsideration." (R. Adden. 14-16) However, that "motion" simply stated 
that Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the district court's decision. (Id.) It offered no argument or 
explanation whatsoever. (Id.) Plaintiffs did not file a brief in support of their motion to reconsider 
1 The original Record inadvertently omitted two pages from the district court's decision, so those 
pages were numbered R. 979(a) and R. 979(b). 
3 
court denied the motion on September 1, 2015. (R. Adden. 90-91) 
C. Statement of Facts 
The Lucky Friday mine is one of the deepest underground silver mines in the United States, 
with its primary shaft descending one mile below the surface. (R. 14, ,I 21) The mine is located near 
Mullan, Idaho, in the Silver Valley, and is owned and operated by Hecla and its affiliated companies. 
(Id. ,i 20) The primary method of mining at the Lucky Friday is the "underhand" method, whereby 
the rock and mineral at each level is mined, and then replaced with a mixture of sand and cement. (R. 
773 (Bayer Decl.))2 After that, the level in1mediately below it is mined and replaced with sand and 
cement, and so on, as the miners follow the mineral vein do"\\'llWard. (Id. at 772-73) This method has 
been used at the Lucky Friday for years. (R. 114-15, 11. 23:16-24:4 (Dep. Tr. ofT. Ruff)) 
In April 2011, one of the active stopes at the Lucky Friday mine was the 6150-15-3 stope.3 
At that particular stope, two mineral veins were corning together as they descended downward. (R. 
773 (Bayer Deel.)) In the levels above 6150-15-3, the veins were still far enough apart to mine each 
vein separately, leaving a keystone-shaped "pillar" of unrnined rock between them. (Id. at 773, 77 5) 
However, at 6150-15-3, the veins were close enough together that leaving a pillar between them was 
2 Doug Bayer was Mine Superintendent at the Lucky Friday Mine in 2011. (R. 772 (Bayer Deel.)) 
He has a degree in Mining Engineering, and was Chief Engineer at the Lucky Friday Mine before 
becoming Mine Superintendent. (Id.) 
3 A "stope" is a horizontal "cut" that the miners make into a mineral deposit. 
4 
J. a was 
both veins together, without a pillar between. (Id) Because the Lucky Friday uses the underhand 
method, that meant that the ceiling above 6150-15-3 had already been mined and contained a pillar. 
(Id. at 781-82) 
The mining plan was reviewed and approved by Doug Bayer, the mine's Superintendent. (R. 
774 (Bayer Deel.); R. 495, 11. 9:8-16 (Bayer Dep.); App. Brief 28) It was also reviewed by John 
Jordan, the mine's General Manager. (R. 780-81 (Jordan Deel.)) Both Bayer and Jordan are mining 
engineers, and both served previously as the mine's Chief Mining Engineer. (R. 772 (Bayer Deel.); 
R. 780 (Jordan Deel.)) Bayer concluded that the mimng plan was safe, because the rock at the Lucky 
Friday mine experiences horizontal pressure-that pressure pushing in from the sides-50% 
greater than the vertical pressure, which would push against the keystone-shaped pillar above 6150-
15-3 and support it. (R. 775 (Bayer Deel.); see also R. 678, 11. 107:12-15 (Dep. Tr. ofT. DeVoe5) ("So 
the Gold Hunter [vein in the mine] is remarkably less seismically active, and that clamping pressure 
we talk about from horizontal orientation is very effectual and again why I wasn't concerned about 
the pillar.")) Jordan likewise did not believe the plan was unsafe. (R. 782 (Jordan Deel.)) This 
method had been successfully used before at the mine. (R. 775-76 (Bayer Decl.))6 
4 John Jordan was the General Manager of the Lucky Friday Mine in 2011. (R. 780 (Jordan Deel.)) 
He has a degree in Mining Engineering, and was Mine Superintendent and Chief Engineer at the 
Lucky Friday Mine before becoming General Manager. (Id.) 
5 Terry De Voe has been the Chief Geologist at the Lucky Friday mine since 2008. (R. 653, 11. 
7:18-24 (Dep. Tr. of T. De Voe)) 
6 Plaintiffs assert that the length of the "cut" at the 6150-15-3 stope was "for a distance greater 
than had ever been done before at the mine," citing the testimony of John Lund and Doug Bayer. 
5 
1, at 
Friday mine. (R. 15, ,I 29) Both Pete and Mike were experienced miners, each with more than 25 
years of mining experience, and with seven or more years specifically at the Lucky Friday. (R. 14, ,r,r 
23-26) Although both Mareks worked in the 6150-15-3 stope v,rhen there was mining being conducted 
there, they were not assigned there on April 15, 2011 because the stope was "muck bound," meaning 
the rock excavated by the previous shift had not been removed from the work area and therefore no 
further mining could be done until the rock was cleared (which would not be accomplished before the 
end of their shift that day). (R. 791-92 (Dep. Tr. ofD. Stepro)) As a result, Hecla assigned the Mareks 
on April 15 to the spray chamber on the 6150 level, which was outside the 6150-15-3 stope. (R. 791 
(Stepro Dep.); see also R. 978 n.2 (Dist. Ct. Order) ("It is undisputed by the parties that Mike and 
Pete were not assigned to work in the 6150-15-3 stope.")) However, theMareks decided on their own 
to spend time at the 6150-15-3 stope, to water down the "muck." (R. 15, ,r 34; see also R. 978 n.2 
("they were assigned to work on the spray chamber in the 6150 slot and chose to water down the 
muck in the 6150-15-3 stope.")) To be clear, this was not a violation of policy-so long as miners 
complete their assigned work during their shift, they have discretion as to whether to spend time on 
other activities, or do nothing at all, for the balance of their shift-but they were not directed or 
expected by anyone to take any action beyond working on the spray chamber. (R. 791-92 (Stepro 
Dep.); R. 978 n.2 (Dist. Ct. Order)) 
(App. Brief 6, citing R. 717-18, 11. 13:18-14:13 and R. 500, 11. 26:24-28:4) Neither passage 
supports the assertion, as both witnesses testified such a length had been done successfully in the 
past. (R. 717-18, 11. 13:18-14:13 and R. 500, 11. 26:24-28:4) 
6 
were on west 
Mike on the east side, the ceiling of the west side of the stope collapsed. (R. 15-16, ,r 38) Pete Marek 
was fatally injured in the collapse. (R. 16, ,r 41) Mike Marek alleges he suffered injuries. (R 21, 
,r 71) 
Following the accident, MSHA cited Hecla for "fail[ing] to adequately examine and test the 
ground conditions to determine if additional measures needed to be taken" to support the pillar above 
the stope. (R. 17, i 50) MSHA characterized Heda's conduct as "more than ordinary negligence." 
(Id.) However, it did not conclude the conduct was willful or intentional. Hecla appealed the citation. 
On appeal, the reviewing MSHA administrative law judge upheld certain of the citations ( and vacated 
others), but explained that "I do not believe that Hecla intentionally risked the lives of miners." (App. 
Brief 11) 
II. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same 
as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Estate of Becker 
v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,525 (2004). In the trial court, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
oflaw." Id. "If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question oflaw 
remains, over which [the] Court exercises free review." Id. 
Similarly, "when the district court grants summary judgment and then denies a motion for 
reconsideration, this Court must determine whether u\e evidence presented a genuine issue of material 
7 
to means the 
for reconsideration de novo." J;,fassey v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 156 Idaho 476, 480 (2014) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Properly Determined That Plaintiffs' Claims Are Barred 
Because The Worker's Compensation Law Is Their Exclusive Remedy. 
The district court correctly held that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the worker's 
compensation law. That law provides that "the liability of the employer under this law shall be 
exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents, 
heirs, legal representatives or assigns." Idaho Code § 72-209(1 ). Thus, for nearly all claims of injuries 
at work, an employee cannot bring suit, but has recourse only to the worker's compensation system 
(the "Exclusivity Rule"). TI1e statute contains a narrow exception: If the injury was caused by the 
"wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" of the employer or its agents, then the worker's 
compensation law is not the exclusive recourse for the employee, and he or she can bring both a 
worker's compensation claim and a lawsuit. Idaho Code§ 72-209(3). 
1. This Court's Decisions In Kearney And DeMoss Preclude Plaintiffs' 
Claims. 
This Court has twice addressed the scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. In each 
case, the Court held that "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" means conduct intended to 
mJure. 
First, in Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755 (1988), the Court reviewed a case brought by an 
employee who was injured while working as a landscaper when her right foot was partially severed 
8 
at 1Il was for 
"wilful or unprovoked physical aggression," and so fell within the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. 
Id. at 756-57. Specifically, the employee argued that her employer did not install "a safety device and 
a grip that would shut off the engine when the operator's hands came off the handlebars," which "were 
included in the parts shipped with the chassis," and also that the employer "did not install a grass 
deflector that was shipped with the chassis," which "would have covered an opening at the rear of the 
lmvn mower that exposed the rotary blade and the cutting area." Id. The employee claimed that the 
employer was "willfully, wantonly and grossly negligent, which negligence was so extreme as to be 
substantially certain to injure someone." Id.7 
This Court held that the employee's exclusive recourse was the worker's compensation law. 
It explained that "[t]he word 'aggression"' in the statute "connotes 'an offensive action' such as an 
'overt hostile attack."' Kearney, 114 ldaho at 757. Thus, to invoke the exception, an employee must 
have "evidence of some offensive action or hostile attack." Id. The Court held further that "[i]t is not 
sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts," even if those acts "made it 
substantially certain that injury would occur." Id. (emphasis added). Applying this principle, the 
Court explained that "[t]here was no evidence presented to the trial court in this case that the employer 
wilfully or without provocation physically and offensively or hostilely attacked the employee." Id. 
Consequently, "the trial court was justified in granting summary judgment against the employee." Id. 
7 Plaintiffs argue that Kearney involved "merely simple negligence." (App. Brief 19) As the 
discussion above makes clear, that is inaccurate. Rather, the plaintiff there contended that her 
allegations were for willful conduct. 
9 
Exclusivity Rule "require[ s] an intention to injure the employee." Id. It affirmed summary judgment 
for the defendants. Id. 
The Court took up the exception to the Exclusivity Rule again in DeMoss v. City of Coeur 
d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176 (1990). There, four employees sued their employer, which had ordered them 
to cut up a boiler so that it could be removed from a community center. Id. at 176-77. One of the 
employees had told the foreman assigned to the project that he suspected the boiler contained asbestos 
insulation. Id. at 177. No effort was taken by the foreman to investigate that suspicion. Id. Instead, 
the foreman forged ahead and ordered the employees to remove the insulation material from the boiler. 
Id. He told the employees that "nobody knew for sure what the material was and that there was a 
minin1al risk." Id. Later, the employer tested the insulation, and it did contain asbestos. Id. Even so, 
a supervisor aware of the test results told the foreman that the material "was harmless, and that no 
hazard would be presented by its removal." Id. The foreman again ordered the employees to work 
with the insulation. Id. Only later did the employees find out they had been working with dangerous 
asbestos. Id. In their lawsuit, they argued that the defendants "knew the material they required the 
appellants to remove was asbestos; that the defendants 'lied' to the appellants by not telling them it 
was asbestos; and that the defendants failed to provide adequate protective gear to the appellants, all 
of which was tantamount to an 'offensive action or hostile attack."' Id. at 178. 
This Court disagreed. It explained that "the plaintiffs all acknowledged that they had no 
reason to believe any of the defendants harbored ill feelings toward them or wanted to cause them 
injury in any manner." DeMoss, 118 Idaho at 179. Further, although an employee had indicated that 
10 
not or any 
defendants actually knew that it was asbestos until the test results from the laboratory were received." 
Id. Finally, the Court explained, although the employer still sent the employees to work with the 
asbestos after it received the test results, it did give them some protective clothing. And, "while the 
protective clothing provided to the workers prior to the second round of removal may indeed have 
been inadequate, that does not rise to the level of 'unprovoked physical aggression."' Id. 
Consequently, citing to Kearney, the Court held that "[t)he plaintiffs have not proved any 'wilful or 
unprovoked physical aggression' as required in I.C. § 72-209(3), and thus the plaintiffs' state tort 
claims were preempted by the Worker's Compensation Act." Id. And the Court further held: "To 
reiterate what we said in Kearney v. Denker, 'It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor 
committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury would occur."' Id. It affirmed 
summary judgment for the defendants. Id. 
Kearney and DeMoss are dispositive of Plaintiffs' claims here, for Plaintiffs have submitted 
no evidence whatsoever of any intent to injure. Thus, as in Kearney, even if Defendants' actions made 
it substantially certain that injury would occur by implementing the mining plan for stope 6150-15-
3-which, to be clear, Defendants do not concede8-that would not be enough. And, as in DeMoss, 
even if Defendants knew the stope might be unsafe-which, again, Defendants do not concede-that 
8 For instance, Doug Bayer, the Mine Superintendent, swore in his declaration that he "personally 
visited the stope" on April 13, 2011-only two days before the accident. (R. 777 (Bayer Deel.)) 
. No evidence conflicts with Bayer's s_wom statement. If Bayer knew the stope was unsafe, as 
Plaintiffs contend, there is no explanation for why he would have put himself in harm's way by 
going to the very spot where he knew there would be an imminent collapse. 
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not to 
when an employer or its agents take affim1ative acts with an intent to injure the employee. There is 
no evidence of that here, and not even any allegation of it. To the contrary, Plaintiffs concede that 
they argue only that Defendants engaged in "reckless conduct." (App. Brief 4 ("The Marcks, on the 
other hand, contend that the rock fall at the mine-resulting from Heda's reckless conduct .... ") 
( emphasis added)) And the MSHA administrative law judge explained that he "[ did] not believe that 
Hecla intentionally risked the lives of miners." (Id. at 11) 
Plaintiffs' opening brief in this Court proves the point. In support of their position that 
Defendants' conduct was "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression," Plaintiffs argue (1) that "[n]o 
engineer review and approval was secured" (App. Brief 28)9; (2) "[s]afety review and safety steps 
9 Although it is irrelevant to whether Plaintiffs can satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule, 
Plaintiffs have no evidence indicating that an engineer did not review and approve the mining plan. 
Rather, Doug Bayer, who was Mine Superintendent, and is a mine engineer by training and former 
Chief Mining Engineer at the mine, reviewed the mining plan for the 6150-15-3 stope. 
(See supra at 5) Bayer determined that "I felt the 6150-15-3 stope was stable because of its V 
shape in a keystone-type orientation and with the horizontal pressures that I am familiar with in 
the Gold Hunter deposit." (R. 775 (Bayer Deel.)) Further, Bayer explained that ifhe "had viewed 
the 6150-15-3 cut as a hazardous mining activity, [he] would have shut down the stope." (Id.) The 
mine's General Manager, John Jordan, who is also a mine engineer by training and a former Chief 
Mining Engineer at the mine, saw the plan in advance as well and did not believe it was unsafe. 
(R. 780-82 ("I had no reason to believe that this mining configuration would not be stable." 
Further, "Based upon the information provided to me I felt that the mining configuration in the 
6150-15-3 stope could be mined safely.")) No evidence contradicts Mr. Bayer and Mr. Jordan's 
testimony. Rather, the evidence discussed in Plaintiffs' brief suggests only that the mine's then-
current Chief Mining Engineer, who was subordinate to Mr. Jordan, did not review the mining 
plan. (App. Brief28-29) But Plaintiffs submit no evidence that such review was required, or even 
that it was negligent not to obtain such review. And Plaintiffs omit further testimony from the 
Chief Mining Engineer that he had in fact reviewed the mining plan. (R. 533, 11. 15:7-13 
(Krusemark Dep.) ("Q. Why hadn't you seen the map before when it was posted on the wall? A. 
12 
not at at 
31 ); and ( 4) "Hecla was significantly sanctioned by MSHA" (id. at 36). As an initial matter, these are 
all alleged failures to act, and so cannot possibly be considered "aggression" under the worker's 
compensation law. Idaho Code§ 72-209(3). Further, they are classic negligence theories, and so run 
headlong into the holdings of Kearney and DeMoss, as well as the statute's requirement that the acts 
"wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." Id. None of Plaintiffs' arguments, not alone and not 
in conjunction, contains a shred of a suggestion that any Defenda11t intended to injure Pete or Mike 
Marek. 
The same is true as to Plaintiffs' contention that "Hecla placed the Mareks directly into 
danger." (App. Brief 34) This argument does not satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule, for, 
even if supported by the evidence, it is no different than the employer in Kearney, who placed the 
employee in danger with an unsafe lawn mower, or the employer in DeMoss, who sent the employees 
to work with what at first it knew might be asbestos and then did so again even after it knew the 
material definitively was asbestos. But, regardless, Plaintiffs' argument is not supported by the 
evidence. The evidence is undisputed that neither of the Mareks were directed to work in the 6150-
15-3 stope on the day of their accident. As Dale Stepro, a Hecla supervisor, testified, "At the 
beginning of the shift, I talked to [the Mareks], let them know that their stope was muckbound and 
that they would be working on cleaning the spray chamber and also repairing in the intersection right 
Well, I - - you know, it - - to say that I didn't - - hadn't seen it is kind of a - - not a very good 




802, 74:10-13 ("Q. Do you recall what you were asked to do by Mr. Stepro that evening? A. Yeah, 
he told us to work on the spray chamber.")) Thus, Defendants did not send the Mareks to the location 
where the accident occurred; the Mareks chose to go there on their ovm. This alone defeats any 
suggestion of a v.ii.llful act or physical aggression. 
Plaintiffs do their best to hide this truth. Plaintiffs say "[i]t was alleged, and facts establish, 
that the Mareks were ordered to work in a dangerous environment." (App. Brief 34) But they then 
cite only to the complaint-to their unverified allegations. At summary judgment, Plaintiff'> cannot 
rely on allegations to counter Defendants' evidence. See, e.g., Mc Vicker v. City of Lewiston, 134 Idaho 
34, 37 (2000) ("the opposing party must set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial 
and cannot merely rest on the pleadings"). Plaintiffs argue it was "anticipated and foreseen" that the 
Mareks might go to the stope, and that the Mareks did not do anything wrong by being there. (App. 
Brief 35) But that is not the point. The point is that Defendants did not send them there-did not 
take an affirmative act that might satisfy the "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" exception to 
the Exclusivity Rule. Therefore, even if sending them into the stope would satisfy the exception to 
the Exclusivity Rule (which it would not), the evidence is uncontroverted that Defendants did not do 
so. 
2. Idaho's Rule Is In Accord With The Majority Of Other States. 
The requirement of intent to injure is the rule not just in Idaho, but widely throughout the 
country, adopted by both courts and legislatures. Indeed, one leading treatise explains that it is "the 
almost unanimous rule" that "misconduct of the employer short of a conscious and deliberate intent 
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not satisfy 
9 Larson s Workers' Compensation Law § 103.03.10 The treatise further explains: 
Even if the alleged conduct goes beyond aggravated negligence, and includes such 
elements as knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, knowingly 
ordering employees to perform an extremeiy dangerous job, wilfully failing to 
furnish a safe place to work, fostering a culture of alcohol use at off-premises, after-
hours company events, wilfully violating a safety statute, failing to protect 
employees from crime, refusing to respond to an employee's medical needs and 
restrictions, or withholding information about worksite hazards, the conduct still 
falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of accidental 
character. 
Id. (internal footnotes omitted). In short, to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule there 
must be a "deliberate infliction of harm comparable to an intentional left jab to the chin." Id. 
For instance, in Van Biene v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 779 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989), the Alaska 
Supreme Court reviewed a lawsuit against an employer brought by the families of commercial airline 
pilots who were killed when their plane crashed. The plaintiffs alleged that the employer required the 
pilots to fly even though, "[b]y completing this mission, [the pilots] would necessarily violate the 
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) flight time and duty regulations." Id. at 316. Further, other 
pilots reported the employer's "disapproval of pilots' refusals to fly because they were fatigued." Id. 
10 Larson's has been cited repeatedly by this Court as authoritative on worker's compensation 
issues. See, e.g., Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., 159 Idaho 324, 338 (2015); Corgatelli 
v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,293 (2014); Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. #401, 147 
Idaho 277, 285-86 (2009). Larson's has also been held out as authoritative by other state supreme 
courts. See, e.g., Helfv. Chevron US.A., Inc., 361 P.3d 63, 82 (Utah 2015) (describing Larson's 
as a "leading commentator"); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Wilson, 199 P.3d 581, 590 (Alaska 
2008) (referring to Larson's as "a leading text"); Kawakami v. City and County of Honolulu, 59 
P.3d 920, 924 (Haw. 2002) (referring to Larson's as "the leading treatise on worker's 
compensation"); Brittingham v. St. Michael's Rectory, 788 A.2d 519, 523 (Del. 2002) (referring 
to Larson's as "the leading authoritative treatise on the subject"). 
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a night flight ... without adequate rest or sleep." Id. 
The court held that the allegations were insufficient to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity 
Rule. It explained that "the facts alleged fail to make out an intentional tort. At best, the complaint 
alleges gross negligence or wilful and knowing violation of FAA regulations." Van Biene, 779 P.2d 
at 318. The court explained further that "[t]he vast majority of courts have held that such allegations 
do not constitute an intentional act allov.ing suit outside of the worker's compensation act." Id. 
In .lvfoore v. Environmental Construction Corp., 147 S.W.3d 13 (Ky. 2004), the Kentucky 
Supreme Court heard an appeal of a claim by the family of an employee who was killed when a trench 
he was digging collapsed. After the collapse, the Occupational Health & Safety Administration 
investigated, and "issued four serious citations" against the employer, including for "failing to provide 
a ladder to escape the trench; for failure to have a competent person conduct daily inspection of trench; 
and for not taking adequate safety precautions for a trench over five feet deep." Id. at 16 & n.4. The 
case was tried to a jury, which determined that the employer had caused the employee's death through 
"deliberate intention." Id. at 14. 
Despite the jury's verdict, the court held that the evidence did not satisfy the exception to the 
Exclusivity Rule. The court explained that, to satisfy the exception, "the employer must have 
determined to injure an employee and used some means appropriate to that end, and there must be 
specific intent" Moore, 147 S.W.3d at 16. "The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness 
that the act is causing appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the risk is great the 
conduct may be characterized as reckless or wanton, but it is not an intentional wrong." Id. at 16-17. 
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court 
of the possible consequences does not amount to a deliberate intention to produce [the employee's] 
death." Id. at 18-19. 
Similarly, in Rafferty v. Hartman Walsh Painting Co., 760 A.2d 157 (Del. 2000), the Delaware 
Supreme Court reviewed a lawsuit brought by the family of an employee of a painting company who 
had fallen off a bridge he was painting and died. The plaintiff alleged "numerous acts of negligence, 
in violation of Occupational Safety Health Administration ('OHSA') safety regulations, includ[ing] 
the failure to provide a training program for employees concerning personal fall arrest systems, failure 
to provide a safe working environment, and a failure to meet necessary safety requirements in the 
operation of equipment." Id. at 160. 
The court held that the allegations were insufficient to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity 
Rule. It first explained that "there is a split of authority as to how to judge an employer's conduct and 
two rules have emerged: the intentional tort doctrine followed by the majority of states and the 
substantial certainty doctrine that is followed by only a few states." Rafferty, 760 A.2d at 159-60. 
The intentional tort doctrine-which is what Idaho's legislature adopted, as Kearney explained-
requires "a deliberate intent to bring about injury." Id. at 160. The substantial certainty doctrine 
requires only "that the alleged conduct or condition permitted by the employer caused a situation 
where the employee would definitely be harmed." Id. The plaintiff in Rafferty argued that the court 
should expand the exception to the Exclusivity Rule by adopting the substantial certainty doctrine, 




"[e]ven if Delaware followed the substantial certainty rule. Id. 
Finally, in Grijfin v. Georges, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 24 (Ark. 1979), the Arkansas Supreme Court 
heard a case brought by an employee of a grain warehouse who had been injured when he was pulled 
into an unguarded grain auger. Id. at 25-26. The employee alleged that the auger had "no grate or 
any other protective guard" to prevent people from falling into it; that the employer had removed a 
grate that had been there originally; and that there was usually grain lying on the ground around the 
auger, such that people coming near it could easily slip and fall into it. Id. The employee alleged that 
the employer's actions were "in direct violation of federal and state statutes and regulations," and that 
the employer "could have easily been corrected by installation of a protective covering over the 
opening." Id. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that "the employer was aware that this condition was 
hazardous and dangerous to its employees and recognized the substantial certainty that it would result 
in injury to an employee," but that, despite this knowledge, it "gave [the employee] a dangerous work 
assignment which placed him in direct danger of injury by the auger." Id. 
The court held that the plaintiff's claim did not satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. 
The exception, the court explained, applies only to "acts committed with an actual, specific and 
deliberate intent on the part of the employer to injure the employee." Grijfin, 589 S.W.2d at 27. Thus, 
to satisfy the exception, "the complaint must be based upon allegations of an intentional or deliberate 
act by the employer with a desire to bring about the consequences of the act, and not upon allegations 
of wilful and wanton conduct by negligent direction to the employee to use a.device Jmown by the 
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to or warn 
was aware." Id. 11 
11 The four decisions discussed above are representative of a large body of law from other states 
that is in full accord with this Court's precedent in Kearney and DeMoss. Accord Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§ 23-1022 ( exclusivity rule applies unless the employee was subject to "an act done knowingly 
and purposely with the direct object of injuring another."); Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc., 
30 P.3d 57, 60 (Cal. 2001) (holding that "intended injurious conduct" is required to satisfy the 
exception to the exclusivity rule); Schwindt v. Hershey Foods Corp., 81 P.3d 1144, 1147 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2003) ("We agree with the analysis in the Larson's treatise and decline to adopt the 
'substantial certainty' approach taken by a minority of the courts."); Copass v. fllinois Power Co., 
569 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) ("we hold that plaintiff is required to allege defendants 
had the specific intent to injure."); Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. C01p., 637 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 
(Ind. 1994) ("nothing short of deliberate intent to inflict an injury, or actual knowledge that an 
injury is certain to occur, will suffice"); Johnson v. Mountaire Farms, 503 A.2d 708, 711-12 (Md. 
1986) (to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule requires "an intentional or deliberate act by 
the employer with a desire to bring about the consequences of the act"); Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 418.131 ( exception to the exclusivity rule satisfied only when "the employer specifically 
intended an injury"); Gunderson v. Harrington, 632 N.W.2d 695, 703 (Minn. 2001) (the employee 
must identify evidence the employer "consciously and deliberately intended to injure" in order to 
satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule); Bowden v. Young, 120 So.3d 971, 982 (Miss. 2013) 
("the plaintiff must show actual intent to injure the employee"); Light v. JC. Indus., 926 S.W.2d 
25, 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (worker's compensation is the exclusive remedy "so long as the 
employer does not intentionally injure the employee"); Harris v. State, 294 P.3d 382, 386 (Mont. 
2013) ( an employee must show "an intentional and deliberate act specifically and actually intended 
to cause injury"); Conway v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 8 P.3d 837, 840 (Nev. 2000) (requiring 
that the employer "deliberately and specifically intended to injure them"); Pereira v. St. Joseph's 
Cemetery, 54 A.D.3d 835, 836-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) ("the conduct must be engaged in with 
the desire to bring about the consequences of the act; a mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk 
is not the same as the intent to cause injury"); N .D. Cent. Code § 65-01-01.1 (employer's action 
must be taken "with the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury"); Kaminski v. Metal & Wire 
Prods., 927 N.E.2d 1066, 1079 (Ohio 2010) ("the only way an employee can recover is if the 
employer acted with intent to cause injury"); 85 Okla. Stat. § 302 (defining "intent" for purposes 
of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule as the "willful, deliberate, specific intent of the employer 
... to causesuch injury"); Peay_v:_J!.:§: §tU~a_c;_o., 437 S.E.2d 64 (S.C. 199-3) (enforcing intentional 
tort doctrine, and refusing to adopt substantial certainty doctrine); Valencia v. Freeland & Lemm 
Constr. Co., 108 S.\V.3d 239, 240 (Tenn. 2003) (requiring "actual intent to injure"); Vallandigham 
v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 109 P.3d 805,810 (Wash. 2005) ("Even failure to observe safety 
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join the broad majority rule that actual intent to injure is required in order to satisfy the 
exception to the Exclusivity Rule. 
3. Plaintiffs Mischaracterize Precedent. 
Rather than rely on this Court's authoritative precedent interpreting the meaning of the "wilful 
or unprovoked physical aggression" exception to the Exclusivity Rule, Plaintiffs rely on other 
decisions that are either not authoritative or do not address the scope of the exception. 
First, Plaintiffs quote extensively from Justice Huntley's concurrence in Kearney (App. Brief 
19-20) There are a number of problems with this approach. First, and most obvious, Justice Huntley's 
concurrence was a concurrence. Justice Huntley did not speak for the Court in his opinion, and none 
of the other justices ( all of whom supported the majority opinion) joined his opinion. Second, not 
only did Justice Huntley's views not garner support from other justices, but his views conflicted with 
the majority opinion. Plaintiffs fail to so much as acknowledge that there is a split in authority among 
the states as to the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. (See supra at 17-18) The vast majority of states 
follow the intentional tort doctrine, and a minority of states follow the substantial certainty doctrine. 
(Id.) In Kearney, the majority opinion held that the Legislature had adopted the intentional tort 
doctrine through the worker's compensation law, thereby requiring "an intention to injure the 
employee." Kearney, 114 Idaho at 758. Justice Huntley, however, argued that the Court should 
construe the exception to be satisfied if"injury [was] substantially certain to occur." Id. (Huntley, J., 
-
laws or procedures does not constitute specific intent to injure, nor does an act that had only 
substantial certainty of producing injury."). 
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Plaintiffs pretend as though Justice Huntley was just elaborating on the Court's view, but he was not-
he was arguing that the Court should interpret the statute as adopting a different doctrine. This Court 
expressly rejected the substantial certainty doctrine in its decision. Id. at 757 ("It is not sufficient to 
prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury 
would occur."). And, finally, this Court in DeMoss made no mention whatsoever of Justice Huntley's 
concurrence, reaffirming that the law of the State is the majority opinion in Kearney. 
Second, Plaintiffs contend that Dominguez v. Evergreen Resources, Inc., 142 Idaho 7 (2005) 
changed the rule set out in Kearney and DeA1oss-and apparently did so without saying it was 
changing the rule. (App. Brief 20-22) Plaintiffs misconstrue Dominguez, which did not address the 
scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. Rather, it addressed only the question whether an 
employee can file both a worker's compensation claim and a lawsuit. As the Court summarized, 
"[t]he Employer argues an injury is either (1) an accident sustained in the course of employment, or 
(2) the result of an intentional tort-but cannot be both." Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 11. The employer 
argued further that, because Mr. Dominguez had filed a worker's compensation claim, it was 
"inconsistent for Dominguez to continue to claim he was the victim of an intentional tort." Id. The 
Court disagreed, holding that "an employee is not required to forgo the filing of a worker's 
compensation claim in order to sue his employer for willful or unprovoked physical aggression." Id. 
at 12. Thus, the Court did not address the question already answered by Kearney and DeMoss, 
regarding the scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule; it answered only the separate question . 
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an a 
which is not at issue here. 
Indeed, contrary to Plaintiffs' description of the decision, Dominguez explicitly refused to 
review the merits of the plaintiff's claim. 12 As the Court explained, the plai.ritiffhad secured a default 
judgment against the employer in the district court. Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 7. Consequently, the 
Court held, review of the judgment against the employer "would be improper." Id. at 13. The Court 
explained that "a judgment by default is a final judgment," and "no appeal lies directly from such a 
ruling." Id. at 14. "If a matter was abandoned by the defaulting party and never properly presented 
to the trial court, there can be no error by the trial court on a question it was never asked to consider." 
Id. Thus, Dominguez did not even purport to say anything about whether the facts alleged there 
satisfied the exception to the Exclusivity Rule; it refused to review of the merits of the defendant's 
appeal from the default judgment.13 
12 Although Plaintiffs assert that Dominguez applied Justice Huntley's concurrence in Kearney 
(App. Brief 20, 27), Dominguez did not so much as cite the concurrence, let alone purport to follow 
it. 
13 Plaintiffs argue that Dominguez must have spoken to whether the facts satisfied the exception to 
the Exclusivity Rule, because, even in the event of a default judgment, "the deemed-true 
allegations must still be sufficient to state a legal claim that supports a judgment." (App. Brief26) 
But in making this argument, Plaintiffs simply ignore what this Court said-namely, that it would 
not review the merits of the case. Plaintiffs cannot credibly argue that this Court reached a 
conclusion that it did not actually reach. Plaintiffs' reliance on In re Elias, 302 B.R. 900 (Bankr. 
D. Idaho 2003) is even further afield. That decision, from a federal bankruptcy court, involved the 
same litigants as Dominguez and addressed the question whether the judgment of the district court 
in Dominguez was dischargeable in the employer'sbankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 902. In 
analyzing that question, the court held that the judgment in Dominguez had a preclusive effect on 
the issue of whether the defendants acted with "an extremely harmful state of mind." Id. at 912. 
It said nothing about this Court's decision in Dominguez, which had not even been issued yet. 
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even to 
it not), the facts at issue there are far removed from the evidence here. In Dominguez, the employer 
ordered an employee to enter and clean a tank the emplOyer knew contained cyanide sludge. 
Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 9. The employee, JVrr. Dominguez, alleged-and the allegation was taken 
as true because the employer defaulted-that the employer "knew it was hazardous to enter the steel 
tank, but concealed that fact from Dominguez." Id. After entering the tank, ivfr. Dominguez collapsed 
and lost consciousness. \\/hen firefighters arrived to attempt a rescue, the employer "was allegedly 
uncooperative -with rescue and medical workers, refusing to accurately identify the material in the 
steel tank and thereby hampering Dominguez's rescue and treatment." Id. at 10. 
Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence of any similar intentional conduct here. Rather, the 
district court found that "Dominguez is factually distinguishable from the case at bar in that here, it is 
not alleged that Defendants directed Pete and Mike Marek into a dangerous environment, it has not 
been alleged that Defendants knew that the environment was hazardous, and it has not been alleged 
that Defendants hampered or impeded rescue efforts." (R. 969) The district court was correct. There 
is no evidence that any Defendant (1) directed Pete or Mike Marek to work in the 6150-15-3 stope on 
the day of the accident-rather, the uncontested record shows the Mareks went to the stope on their 
own volition (see supra at 6, 14); (2) knew the 6150-15-3 stope was unsafe-rather, the defendants 
who were involved in developing the mining plan testified that they believed based on past experience 
that the horizontal pressure 50% greater than the vertical pressure would hold the pillar above the 
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scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule, Plaintiffs still could not satisfy it. 
4: Kearney And DeMoss Were Correctly Decided. 
In addition to being the settled law of this State and representative of the majority view across 
the United States, Kearney and DeMoss were rightly decided. The minority view-the substantial 
certainty test-would not be faithful to the language ofidaho's worker's compensation law, and also 
would disturb the balance bet\:veen employees and employers that is inherent in the worker's 
compensation system. 
First, Kearney and Delvfoss were rightly decided because they were true to the statutory 
language in the worker's compensation law. The exception to the Exclusivity Rule provides that 
employees are not exempt from the Exclusivity Rule unless their injury was caused by "wilful or 
14 R. 777 (Bayer Deel.) ("I did not think the 6150-15-3 stope was unsafe when I reviewed the 
projection map with Bruce Cox, during the weekly Wednesday geology tours including the 
geology tour of April 13, 2011 when I personally visited the stope or in any of the weekly Thursday 
meetings when the mining plan was discussed. I did not want to hurt anyone."); R. 782 (Jordan 
Deel.) ("Based on the information provided to me I felt that the mining configuration in the 6150-
15-3 stope could be mined safely. I did not want to hurt anyone."); see also R.R. 678, 11. 107:12-
15 (Dep. Tr. of T. De Voe) ("So the Gold Hunter [ vein in the mine] is remarkably less seismically 
active, and that clamping pressure we talk about from horizontal orientation is very effectual and 
again why I wasn't concerned about the pillar."). 
15 Plaintiffs argue that the Dominguez defendant's attempts to impede rescue efforts are irrelevant 
here, because Pete and Mike Marek suffered injuries during the collapse itself, and the injuries 
were not exacerbated by the rescue efforts. (App. Brief 23 n.5) This misses the point. If 
Dominguez spoke to the facts at all (which, again, it did not), it could have viewed the defendant's 
impeding rescue efforts as evidence of his intent to injure the employee. Thus, the absence of any 
such evidence supporting intent to injure here is a significant factor, regardless of when Pete and 
Mike Marek suffered any injuries. 
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aggression. § Kearney were not 
starting from first principles as to which rule would be best; they were interpreting the specific 
language the Legislature used. And the decisions plainly were correct that "wilful or unprovoked 
physical aggression" indicates intent. As Kearney explained, the term "aggression" connotes an 
affirmative act, such as an "overt hostile attack." Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757. It is not possible to 
commit an overt hostile attack without intent to do so. Thus, Kearney and De]i.foss properly 
interpreted the language of the worker's compensation law. Further, Kearney has now been the law 
for more than 25 years, and the Legislature has not disturbed it, which is all the more reason to believe 
the Court accurately understood the Legislature's intent. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 
480 U.S. 616,629 n.7 (1987) ("Congress has not amended the statute to reject our construction, nor 
have any such amendments even been proposed, and we therefore may assume that our interpretation 
was correct."). 
Second, Kearney and De Moss were rightly decided because adopting the substantial certainty 
test would disrupt one of the primary rationales for the worker's compensation system. As this Court 
has explained, one reason for the worker's compensation system is "to provide sure and certain relief 
for injured workmen ... regardless of fault." Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 851 (2009). However, 
that is not the only reason: Another purpose of the system is to provide something in return to 
employers-"to protect industry by providing a limit on liability." Id.; see also 9 Larson s Workers' 
Compensation Law§ 103.03 (explaining that one of the central purposes to the Exclusivity Rule is 
"to minimize litigation, even litigation of undoubted merit"). 
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test would on 
including, significantly, the limits on litigation expenses. As a practical matter, in almost any tort 
case, a plaintiff can allege negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness. The difference between 
them is not easily resolved without trial. As a result, if recklessness could satisfy the exception to the 
Exclusivity Rule, the number of lawsuits against employers could rise dramatically, as would the 
length and cost of each proceeding, because courts would be unable to resolve whether the employer's 
actions were reckless, or something less, without a trial. Thus, as the Arkansas Supreme Court 
explained in rejecting the substantial certainty test, "if employers are required not only to provide 
worker's compensation but also to defend tort actions of employees and to respond in damages for 
torts, there would be a subversion of the very purpose of the whole workmen's compensation 
scheme." Griffin v. George's, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Ark. 1979). For that reason, Kearney and 
DeMoss not only correctly implemented the Legislature's intent, but also preserved the compromise 
on which the worker's compensation system is premised. 
5. Plaintiffs Misconstrue The District Court's Explanation Of Which 
Side Bears The Burden At Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in holding that Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving 
that they have satisfied the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. (App. Brief 3 9-41) But they confuse 
the ultimate burden on the merits with the burden at summary judgment. The district court got it right. 
To begin, the district court's opinion properly articulated who bears the burden at summary 
judgment: "Once the movant has established a prima facie case that, on the basis of uncontroverted 
facts, the movant is entitled to judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that 
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cannot rest on 
v. of Lewiston, 134 Idaho 34, 37 (2000)) The court also explained that "[i)n order to survive a 
motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must 'make a showing sufficient to establish 
the existence of an element essential to that pa._rty's case on which that party will be the burden of 
proof at trial."' (R. 979-979(a), quoting Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257,259 (2011 )) Both of these 
principles are black-letter law, and the district court correctly identified them. 
Later in the decision, when discussing the merits of the case, the district court held that "the 
burden is on Plaintiffs to prove that their claims fall within the exception to exclusivity." (R. 979(b) 
( emphasis in original)) This was not a discussion of where the burden falls at summary judgment, 
but rather which side bears the ultimate burden of proof on the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. 
The district court was correct that Plaintiffs bear the burden of satisfying the exception to the 
Exclusivity Rule. This Court has consistently stated that the employee must prove willful or 
unprovoked physical aggression in order to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. In Kearney, 
the Court discussed what was necessary "[t]o prove aggression." Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757. In 
DeMoss, the Court held that the plaintiffs' tort claims were preempted by the Exclusivity Rule because 
they had "not proved any 'wilful or unprovoked physical aggression."' DeMoss, 118 Idaho at 178-
79. This reflects how the worker's compensation law itself is structured: Tue law provides the general 
rule that "the liability of the employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other 
liability." Idaho Code § 72-209(1). The law then sets out that the "exemptions from liability shall 
not apply in any case where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked 
physical aggression of the employer" or its agents. Idaho Code§ 72-209(3). The statute does not say 
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not apply was not or 
unprovoked physical aggression; it provides an exception to the general rule that employees can avail 
themselves of, which it would be their burden to do. 
That Dcfcndai1ts stated as an affirmative defense that their conduct was not "wilful or 
unprovoked physical aggression" does not change the burden. Defendants often, out of an abundance 
of caution, state as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff failed to plead or prove an element of the 
plaintiff's claim, to ensure there is no confusion that they plan to pursue the issue. But restating an 
element of the plaintiff's claim as an affirmative defense does not change where the burden of proof 
resides. 
Roe v. Albertson s, Inc., 141 Idaho 524 (2005) is not inconsistent with this argument, or with 
Kearney and De}vfoss. In Roe, the question presented was whether the Exclusivity Rule applied at 
all-the general Exclusivity Rule, not the exception to it. In deciding that question, this Court first 
described the summary judgment burden, and did so exactly as the district court did in this case: 
"Albertson's, as the moving party, must show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that 
Doe would have been covered by worker's compensation and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw." Id. at 530. Second, on the merits, the Court held that the employer "must demonstrate Doe 
suffered an injury covered by workers compensation." Id. This ruling did not purport to conflict with 
what the Court had described in Kearney and DeMoss, nor did it in fact conflict with them: \Vhere a 
defendant responds to a tort action by claiming that the Exclusivity Rule applies, it bears the burden 
of proving that the general rule applies. That is Roe. However, where everyone admits that the general 
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employee's burden to establish. That is Kearney and Delvfoss. 
It is also the case at bar. Here, all the parties agree that Plaintiffs' claims are subject to worker's 
compensation-indeed, Plaintiffs long ago filed worker's compensation claims (which have been 
paid). The only question is whether Plaintiffs can prove the "wilful or unprovoked physical 
aggression" that would permit them an exception to the Exclusivity Rule, allowing them to sue in 
addition to filing worker's compensation claims. The district court correctly followed this Court's 
precedent in holding that Plaintiffs bear the burden on the merits of that argument. 
But, regardless, the district court properly implemented the burden at the summary judgment 
stage. Defendants introduced evidence that they had no intent to injure the Mareks-that is, that the 
exception to the Exclusivity Rule did not apply. 16 At that point, having established the prima facie 
case of entitlement to summary judgment, the burden fell to Plaintiffs to set forth specific facts 
countering Defendants' evidence as to Defendants' intent. Plaintiffs did not. The district court 
correctly held that "Plaintiffs have failed to put forth evidence that Defendants harbored any ill \\ill 
toward Mike and/or Pete, nor have Plaintiffs put forth any evidence the Defendants wanted to cause 
injury or death to Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact on the issue of whether Idaho Worker's Compensation provides Plaintiffs their exclusive 
remedy." (R. 984) Plaintiffs disagree that their evidence does not satisfy the exception to the 
. ... ..... ~- ....... ~ 
16 R. 777 (Deel. Doug Bayer) ("I did not want to hurt anyone."); R. 782 (Deel. John Jordan) ("I 
did not want to hurt anyone."). 
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case not a at 
judgment. 
Additionally, who ultimately bears the burden on the merits of whether the exception applies 
is not presented by th.is case. That is, this case does not turn on whether tl1e exception is pa._rt of 
Plaintiffs' claim or an affirmative defense. Rather, the district court correctly explained that "[i]n the 
case at bar, there are no allegations that Defendants acted with any subjective intent to hann Pete 
and/or Mike Marek, nor are there any allegations that Defendants believed that harm was substantially 
ce1tain to occur." (R. 981) At that point, it does not matter which side bears the burden of proof. It 
is clear from either point of view that the exception does not apply. 
B. The District Court Correctly Held That There Are No Disputed Issues Of 
Material Fact Precluding Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiffs' second argument on appeal is that the district court wrongly held that there are no 
disputed issues of material fact that prevented it from ruling on the legal question whether the 
exception to the Exclusivity Rule applies here. (App. Brief 41-42) This argument merely rehashes 
Plaintiffs' attempt to reinterpret what satisfies the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. For the reasons 
explained above, Kearney and DeMoss are good law, and they require an intent to injure. Because 
the district court correctly held that there is no evidence of any intent to injure, it was correct that 
"whether Defendants received warnings that the mining practices were dangerous and whether it was 
necessary for the chief engineer to approve the mining plan" do not preclude summary judgment. (R. 
984) 
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Servants And Immune From Suit. 
The worker's compensation law provides that "[t]he exemption from liability given an 
employer by this section shall also extend to the employer's surety and to all officers, agents, servants 
and employees of the employer." Idaho Code § 72-209(3). As a result, the district court correctly 
held that the individual defendants in this case are "immune from liability" under the Exclusivity Rule 
the same way that Hecla and its corporate affiliates are. (R. 985) 
Plaintiffs' argument that the individual defendants were not entitled to summary judgment is 
based on the same arguments Plaintiffs made as to Hecla, and is wTOng for the same reasons 
articulated above. 
D. The Trial Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration. 
Plaintiffs' final argument is that the district court improperly denied their motion to reconsider. 
(App. Brief 43-45) But the motion was improper both procedurally and on the merits. Thus, the 
district court's denial of it was proper. 
1. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiffs' 
Motion To Reconsider. 
The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion to reconsider for two reasons: 
First, Plaintiffs failed to timely file a particularized statement of the grounds for the motion until 
months too late. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a )(2)(B) provides that motions to reconsider may 
not be filed more than fourteen days after entry of final judgment. And Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
7(b )(1) provides that all motions "shall state with particularity the grounds therefor." The district 
cow-t entered final judgment on }.1ay 5, 2015. (R. 988-89) Plait1tiffs filed a document captioned a 
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not comply 
with Rule 7(b )(1) because it did not state with particularity its grounds for seeking reconsideration. 
Plaintiffs did not file a document that stated their grounds for seeking reconsideration until August 4, 
2015, well after the fourteen-day period after final judgment within which the mks permitted them 
to file a motion to reconsider. (R. Adden. 40-48) 
The district court correctly held that Plaintiffs had filed their actual motion to reconsider too 
late. (Tr. 9:2-5 ("So I'm going to find that you're correct, .Mr. Ramsden, in your interpretation of the 
rules ... ")) However, the court then held that it would hear Plaintiffs' motion anyway. (Id.(" . .. but 
I'm going to decline your invitation to refuse to hear the plaintiffs' motion.")) That decision was 
improper. Rule 11 ( a)(2)(B) does not give courts discretion to forgive untimely motions to reconsider, 
and Rule 7(b )(1) does not give courts discretion to disregard the requirement that all motions must 
state their grounds for relief. Thus, the court lacked discretion to disregard what it admitted was 
Plaintiffs' failure to file timely. 
Second, to the extent Plaintiffs' August 2015 motion was considered something other than a 
motion to reconsider, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it because Plaintiffs filed a notice 
of appeal on May 22, 2015 that divested the district court of jurisdiction for most purposes. (R. 990-
95) As this Court has explained, "[ o ]nee a notice of appeal has been perfected the district court is 
divested of jurisdiction and the proceedings are stayed during the pendency of the appeal." H & V 
Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd of Prof Engineers & Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646,648 (1987). 
Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b) contains exceptions to that divestiture, providing specific actions that the 
district court can take, but Plaintiffs' belated motion would not fall into any of them. Once Plaintiffs 
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to to to 
was forfeited. 
2. The District Court's Ruling Denying Plaintiffs' Motion To Reconsider 
On The Merits Was Correct. 
Plaintiffs argue that the district court's decision denying their motion to reconsider on the 
merits was erroneous for three reasons: (1) incorrect assignment of the burden of proof on affirmative 
defenses on cross-motions for swnmary judgment; (2) the scope of the Mareks' work on April 15, 
2011; and (3) the import of the MSHA decision after entry of summary judgment. (App. Brief 43) 
Notwithstanding the district court's lack of jurisdiction to consider the motion, the court's rejection of 
Plaintiffs' arguments was correct. 
First, as to the burden at summary judgment, the district court's decision was correct for the 
reasons discussed above. (See supra at 27-31) As the district court explained, "Hecla clearly met any 
initial burden it had pleading the affirmative defense, by presenting a record that shows there is no 
wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." (Tr. 26: 1-3) 
Second, the district court correctly ruled that it is irrelevant whether the Mareks were acting 
within the scope of the work by being in the 6150-15-3 stope on April 15, 2011. The court correctly 
explained that "that's not the test." (Tr. 26:13-19) Rather, if relevant at all, the question would be 
"was there express direction to go in there which amounted to wilful or unprovoked physical 
aggression." (Id.) The court correctly held that it is uncontroverted that there was no such direction. 
(See supra at 6, 14) Further, even if Plaintiffs had been directed to the stope, it would not satisfy 
Kearney and DeMoss, for the reasons explained above. (See supra at 13-14) Plaintiffs' argument to 
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on concarrence is not at 
Third, Plaintiffs argue that the district court failed to consider the decision of an MSHA 
administrative law judge affirming some ofMSHA's earlier citations against Hecla. (App. Brief 43-
45) (He vacated other citations.) But again, this argument relies on a reinterpretation of Kearney and 
DeA1oss that Plaintiffs advance in the main part of their argument and that the district court correctly 
rejected. The MSHA administrative law judge explicitly found that "I do not believe that Hecla 
intentionally risked the lives of miners." (App. Brief 11) That he concluded Hecla was reckless does 
not satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule, as explained above. As the court explained, "I can 
get negligence, I cai'l. get to maybe some sort of aggravated negligence, but I can't get beyond 
negligence. There just aren't the facts that bring this case within the exception." (Tr. 25:12-15) 
Further, as the district court correctly held, the MSHA administrative law judge's decision is 
inadmissible hearsay, and so could not have been properly considered on summary judgment, even if 
Plaintiffs had submitted it with their earlier briefs. (Tr. 25:12-14 ("I don't believe I'm bound by that 
person's findings.")); I.R.E. 803(8) (providing that "factual findings resulting from special 
investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident" are not excepted from the rule against the 
admission of hearsay); Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 251 (2010) 
(affirming the exclusion of testimony from an investigation by the Idaho Real Estate Commission); 
Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop, Inc., 131 Idaho 242, 246 (1998) (affirming exclusion of determination 
by the Idaho Human Rights Commission). 
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The exception to the Exclusivity Rule requires "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." 
"Wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" requires Defendants to have intended to injure Pete or 
Mike Marek. No evidence of such intent exists on this record and no genuine issue of fact exists. The 
district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants was proper, and should 
affirmed. 
DATED this 17th day of February, 2016. 
ARRIS, LLP 
By~__.:;...<:-__,#'-,,;.,c.....-L---"""-~~~~~~ 
Theron e Smet, Of the Firm 
Attom ys for Defendants/Respondents 
35 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day ofFebruary, 2016, I served two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nikels 
Duke Scanlan & Hall, PLLC 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, ID 83707 
Edward B. Havas 
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN 
36 S. State Street, Ste. 2400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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